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SPRINGER V. ERIE INS. EXCH.: AN INSURER MAY NOT 
INVOKE A BUSINESS PURSUIT EXCLUSION TO ABANDON 
ITS DUTY TO DEFEND WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE 
CONTINUITY AND PROFIT MOTIVE OF ITS INSURED’S 
BUSINESS. 
 
By: Lauren Ellison 
      
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that for a third party complaint to 
trigger a “business pursuits” exclusion, the insurer must consider the 
insured’s business continuity and profit motive.  Springer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 
439 Md. 142, 146, 94 A.3d 75, 78 (2014).  The court further held that the 
allegations made in the third party’s complaint were insufficient to trigger 
the “business pursuits” exclusion. Id.                 
     In 2011, J.G. Wentworth initiated suit against David Springer 
(“Springer”) and Sovereign Funding Group (“Sovereign”) for defamation 
and false light.  Springer and Sovereign allegedly operated publicly 
accessible websites containing false and misleading information in an effort 
to target competitor J.G. Wentworth’s potential and existing customers.  
Springer and Sovereign directed potential customers to visit those particular 
websites while openly denying any connection to the sites. 
     In response to the suit filed by J.G. Wentworth, Springer contacted his 
insurer, Erie Insurance Exchange (“Erie”). Springer requested that Erie 
provide him with legal representation and claimed that they were required to 
do so under the terms of his home insurance policy.  Springer’s policy 
included a provision for personal injury; however, Erie denied Springer’s 
request, citing the policy’s “business pursuits” exclusion clause.  This clause 
negated the insurer’s liability to defend its policyholder if the policyholder is 
accused of a “personal injury arising out of business pursuits . . . .”  With his 
request denied, Springer retained counsel to defend the cause of action 
initiated by J.G. Wentworth, which was subsequently dismissed with 
prejudice. 
     Springer attempted to recover the cost of his legal representation from 
Erie.  Erie refused, and Springer brought suit seeking declaratory relief and 
damages for breach of contract; Erie also counterclaimed seeking declaratory 
relief. Both Erie and Springer filed motions for summary judgment.  The 
Circuit Court for Frederick County granted summary judgment in favor of 
Erie and entered a declaratory judgment in favor of Erie.  The court held that 
the J.G. Wentworth complaint was sufficient to trigger the “business 
pursuits” exclusion, and therefore, Erie had no duty to defend.  Springer 
subsequently filed a timely appeal.  However, before the court of special 
appeals could render a decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland issued a 
writ of certiorari sua sponte.   
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     The court began its analysis by addressing how it interprets ambiguous 
terms in an insurance policy.  Springer, 439 Md. at 158, 94 A.3d at 84-85.  
When faced with ambiguous terms, the court focuses on the policy’s 
“customary, ordinary, and accepted meaning.”  Id. at 158, 94 A.3d at 85 
(citing MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Callaway, 375 Md. 261, 279, 825 
A.2d 995, 1005 (2003)).  In the instant case both “business pursuits” and 
“arising out of” were undefined within the policy and the parties disputed 
their meanings; therefore, the court looked elsewhere for guidance.  
Springer, 439 Md. at 159-61, 94 A.3d at 85-86.  
     Relying on precedent, the court concluded that the phrase “arising out of” 
is interpreted broadly and does not require the harmful act to be the sole 
cause of the injury. Springer, 439 Md. at 159, 94 A.3d at 85 (citing N. 
Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217, 230, 533 A.2d 682, 
689 (1987)).  Specifically, the court concluded “arising out of” to mean 
“originating from, growing out of, flowing from, or the like.”  Springer, 439 
Md. at 159, 94 A.3d at 85 (citing N. Assurance Co. of Am., 311 Md. at 230, 
533 A.2d at 688)). 
     The court recognized that the inquiry did not end there, and proceeded to 
synthesize the meaning of a “business pursuit.” Springer, 439 Md. at 160, 94 
A.3d at 86.  Although “business” was defined in the policy, the term 
“business pursuit” was not. The court stated the implicit purpose of such 
business exclusions is to remove from a homeowner’s policy the type of 
coverage that should be covered under a separate business insurance policy.  
Id. at 160-61, 94 A.3d at 86 (citing Erickson v. Christie, 622 N.W.2d 138, 
140 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)).  Because theCourt of Appeals of Maryland had 
never had the opportunity to examine a business pursuit exclusion, it looked 
to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland for guidance.   
     Previously, the court of special appeals held that when an insured is 
engaged in a professional pursuit requiring his or her time and energy, and 
receives compensation, the act is a “business pursuit.”  Springer, 439 Md. at 
162, 94 A.3d at 87 (citing McCloskey v. Republic Ins. Co., 80 Md. App. 19, 
22-25, 559 A.2d 385, 386-88 (1989)).  Although “business pursuit” has been 
defined by the intermediate court, it did not identify specific variables for an 
insurer to consider.  Springer, 439 Md. at 162, 94 A.3d at 87.   
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland opted to rely on commentators and 
sister courts in adopting a functional two-pronged test.  This test stated that 
to constitute a “business pursuit,” an action must have both continuity and 
profit motive.  Springer, 439 Md. at 162, 94 A.3d at 87 (citing J.A. 
APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW § 
53.06(2)(d)(i)(lib. ed.)).  Continuity is measured by determining whether 
there is continuous activity for the purpose of earning a livelihood.  Springer, 
439 Md. at 162, 94 A.3d at 87 (citing APPLEMAN,supra).  Profit motive is 
measured by demonstrating that the business activity was undertaken as an 
attempt at financial gain. Id. (citing APPLEMAN, supra).  The court concluded 
that continuity and profit motive must be considered when interpreting a 
“business pursuit exclusion.” Id. at 164, 94 A.3d at 89 (emphasis added).  
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     After adopting the two-pronged test, the court addressed its “duty to 
defend” jurisprudence as a related issue regarding third party complaints. 
Springer, 439 Md. at 164, 94 A.3d at 88.  The court has limited the insurer’s 
ability to refuse defense of an insured solely on the basis of a third party 
complaint. Id.  When establishing a duty to defend, a court must answer two 
questions: (1)what type of coverage is in question and what defenses are 
available under the terms of the specific policy, and (2) if the allegations in 
the suit could potentially bring the claim within the policy’s coverage.  Id. at 
167, 94 A.3d at 90 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pryseski, 292 
Md. 187, 193, 438 A.2d 282, 285 (1981)).  The court further asserts that the 
duty to defend should be construed liberally in favor of the insured.  
Springer, 439 Md. 167, 94 A.3d 90 (citing Litz v. State Farm Fire and Cas. 
Co., 346 Md. 217, 231, 695 A.2d 566, 572 (1997)).  
     Having determined the two-prong analysis for the “business pursuits” 
exclusion and an insurer’s duty to defend, the court applied these principles 
to the case at hand.  The court ultimately held that the allegations in the 
complaint were facially insufficient to invoke the “business pursuits” 
exclusion, and were insufficient to uphold the lower court’s rulings for 
declaratory relief and summary judgment in favor of Erie, the third party.  
Springer, 439 Md. at 167-68, 94 A.3d at 90-91.  The court’s indecision as to 
whether Springer was the CEO of Sovereign and if Sovereign was actually a 
registered business entity at the time the suit was filed created enough 
uncertainty that required the court to further explore the extent of the alleged 
“business pursuit.”  Id.  The court also noted that without any information 
regarding profit motive, the “business pursuits” exclusion could not be 
triggered.  Id. at 168.  The court vacated the ruling, and remanded for further 
proceedings.  Id.     In Springer, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
an insurer cannot invoke the “business pursuits” exclusion without first 
considering the insured’s business continuity and profit motive.  Springer has 
established a threshold that insurance companies must meet prior to denying 
a policyholder legal representation under an exclusion within the policy.  The 
court’s decision minimizes the insurer’s discretion in denying legal 
representation on the forefront of a third party lawsuit against an insured.  
Even if there is only a slight possibility that the complaint consists of an 
activity protected under the policy’s coverage, the insurance company will be 
required to legally represent the insured.  Insurance providers should be 
aware of the exclusion language in their policies and be prepared to carefully 
draft new policy exclusions to avoid ambiguity.  
 
 
